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The Committee has asked me to talk with you
today about the future of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I thought it might be helpful if I outline quite briefly
some of the points I would.like to make, some of the
problems I think ought to.be considered, and some of the
steps we have taken.
The first point is that the statutory base
£or the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully
satisfactory.

The basic statutory provision is 28 USC

533 which provides that the Attorney General may appoint
officials "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the
United States;

(2) to assist in the protection of the

President; and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding
official matters under the control of the Department of
Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by
the Attorney General."

There are other statutes, such

··as the Congressional Assassination, Kidnapping and Assault
Act, which

v~st

in the Bureau special responsibilities to

-investigate criminal violations.

In addition, there are

Executive orders and Presidential statements or directives
.which place investigatory responsibilities upon the Bureau.
A number of questions are often asked about this
~tatutory

base.

It has the virtue of simplicity, but the

Executive orders which deal with government employee
investigations are complicated and confusing, and Presidential

- 2 memoranda

or, perhaps, oral instructions from a President

may be difficult to collate.

I think it is important,

in any case, to separate out the kinds of questions which
are asked about the Bureau's authority base.

Some questions

are constitutional in nature, relating to the inherent power
of the President; ,others go to'the interpretation of the
statutes and the relationship between the statutes and
Presidential directives; others go to the failure of the
statutes to define sufficiently the areas of the Bureau's
jurisdiction or to spell out sufficiently--and this is
partly constitutional--the means and methods which the Bureau
is permitted to use in carrying out its assigned tasks.
The second point, related to the first, is a
continuing discussion of the role of the Bureau in intelligence
investigations or domestic security investigations.

The

argument is sometimes made that the Bureau's proper role,
at least in purely domestic matters, should be limit~d to

-

investigations of committed crimes.

The basic statute for

the Bureau is broader than this, as have been Executive
orders and Presidential mandates to the Bureau.

The basic

statute is broader, since it refers to investigations
regarding official matters under the control 'of the Department
of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed
by the Attorney General.

A disparity is sometimes seen

among the different roles of the Bureau in crime detection,

in

on~going

domestic,security matters, and in foreign

intelligence or foreign counterintelligence-matters.

In
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- 3 recent days a statement by the then Attorney General Harlan
Fiske Stone, who reorganized the Bureau and chose J. Edgar
Hoover as its director, has been quoted as a relevant
warning.
Stone warned, "There is always the possibility
that a secret police may become a menace to free government
and free institutions, because it carries with it the
possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly
apprehe~ded

or understood ••••

It is important that its

activities be strictly limited to the performance of those
functions for which it was created and that its agents
themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach .•••
The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political
or other opinions of individuals.

It is concerned only

with their conduct and then only with. such conduct as is
forbidden by the laws of the United States.

When a police

system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the
'proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which
it shOUld be 'our first concern

to cherish."

I should like to suggest that Stones warning always
must be considered relevant to the proper' conduct of the
Bureau's duties, but it does not necessarily follow that
domestic security investigations are, therefore, outside
the Bureau's proper functions.

The detection of crime in

some areas requires preparation and at least some knowledge
of what is likely to be going on.

What is at issue, I think,

4J.5- .
- 4 is the proper scope, the means and methods used, the attention
paid to conduct and not views, and the closeness of the
relationship of the conduct and that which is forbidden by
~he

laws of the United States.
Third, I realize that some proposals, since I

was asked about this when I last appeared before this
Committep, might separate out in some fashion domestic and
foreign intelligence functions from the
another within the FBI.
be looked at.

F~I

or from one

This is, of course, an issue to

I assume it is recognized that there may

be some relationship between that intelligence which is
domestic and that intelligence which is involved in foreign
counterintelligence work.

One may lead to the other.

And there may be a relationship between foreign counterintelligence and foreign intelligence.

If the work were

separated out into different agencies, I do not know if
the decision about when an investigation should pass
from one agency to another always could be made easily.
Moreover, even so, information presumably would pass from
one agency to the other.

I know that one consideration

has been that it might be decided that information collected
by some permitted means in intelligence investigations
under some circumstances should not be used in criminal
prosecutions.

But if there is an exchange of information,

this must always be a consideration, whether there are
separate agencies or not, and the basic question then is one

417
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of use and not organization.

The more active concern,

I believe, is that there is a risk that conduct proper for
one area may be improper for another, and that the combination
can work a contamination.

My view on this is that in any

case we must decide what conduct is appropriate and is
inappropriate

for each of the areas, and we must take

steps to make sure that proper conduct is lived up to.

.

My hope

is that the fact that the FBI has criminal investigative
responsibilities,which must be conducted within the confines
of constitutional protections strictly enforced by the courts,
gives the organization an awareness of the interests of
individual liberties that might be missing in an agency
devoted solely to intelligence work.
can be run the other way.
if there is separation.

I know the argument

I believe the dangers are greater

_.

- 6 -

Fourth, there is a question as to the proper role of
the FBI in crime prevention and whether or not it should be
considered authorized to take steps under some circumstances
to reduce the likelihood that crimes will be committed
or that serious injury to persons or pr?perty will occur.
Preventive action has raised serious questions and these
must be dealt with.

I suppose an initial question is

whether it should be allowed at all.

Yet I believe under

special circumstances and with proper controls most would
pelieve this to be a proper function.
Fifth, the problem of proper controls, supervision and
accountability is all-embracing.

By statute the Federal

Bureau of Investigation is in the Department of Justice,
and also by statute the Attorney General is the head of the
Department of Justice.

The history is mixed, of course, and

we all have a tendency to over-simplify, but it is a fair
statement that there have been times in the past when the
supervision by Attorneys General, granted that the Bureau nrust
have considerable autonomy, has been sporadic, practically
nonexistent, or ineffective.

I hope that is not the case now.

The responsibility is a heavy- one.

But in any-event the prob l

lem of proper controls, supervision and

accounta~ility

beyond the Director of the Bureau and the Attorney

goes

~~neral.

I have already mentioned that in my view the statutory base for

the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfactory.

I think that better controls and performance can

he achieved through statutory means, executive orders, guidelines, and reporting to appropriate congressional committees.

419

- 7 Sixth, before I come to a resume of some of the steps
which have been taken, let me say I know we all realize that
in the past there have been grave abuses.

I am uncomfortable with

a kind of writing of history, however, which sees it only in terms
of the abuses and not in terms of past and present strength.

It

is very difficult to be fair to the past in which many institutions
of government carried a share of responsibility.
unfairness is involved.
solutions of the

~t

If we are not careful, we will turn to
which a better reading of history might

indicate are not the best solutions.
momen~

But more than

if I may use such a phrase in

I know we must seize the
~his

setting.

I know also

·that this Committee realizes ·that a very important agency with
dedicated, highly professional, greatly disciplined government
servants is involved.

The importance is to the security and domestic

tranquility of the united States.
act of creation.

Stone's

war~ing

He was proud of his creation.

abuses, there is a proper place for pride.

was given in an

In spite of the

I take it our mutual

work should be to nurture that pride and the conditions which
justify it.
I turn now to a review of some of the steps which have been
taken or are in progress.

We have tried most diligently, under safe-

guards to protect the privacy of individuals and with an awareness
of the unfairness of instant historY, to give a great deal of information to Congressional committees.

Attorney General Saxbe made public

and Deputy Attorney General Silberman and Director Kelley testified
~out

the so-called COINTELPRO.

When the FBI discovered evidence

of several more COINTELPRO projects after I

u

-

4w·

became Attorney General, these were revealed.

One of my first

acts as Attorney General, my third week in office, was to testify
before a Congressional committee about possible incidents of
political misuse of the FBI by the White House in the past and
about the nature of FBI file-keeping systems, particularly the
files kept by Director Hoover in his office suite.

Ihas

Director Kelley

spoken publicly and before congressional corrnnittees about incidents

in the past in which FBI agents engaged in break-ins to gather
or photograph phYRical evidence in intelligence investigations.

On

a number of occasions, most recently in testimony before this
Committee, I have described the history of the use of electronic
surveillance by the FBI.

We have welcomed such opportunities.

On February 26, 1975, I instructed Director Kelley to report to
me any requests made of the Bureau or practices within the Bureau,

which he deems improper or which present the appearance of impropriety.
~

February 28, 1975, Director Kelley ordered FBI personnel to report

such requests or practices to him.

In July, 1975, I reaffirmed my

February directive and also asked for a report of all sensitive
investigative practices.

The Director promptly complied.

I

:Oirector Kelley has regularly provided information on conduct

~Y

Bureau agents and programs underway within the Bureau that

!could raise questions.
I

These matters have been revie'\Ved and

:discussed within the Deparmtnet so that a consistent and appro1

)riate policy can be schieved.

This is a continuing process.

i

I do not assert that we are aware of every thins about the Bureau.
!
Hor do I suggest that we ought to know everything. Appropriate

- 9 -

communicatio~,

consultation and supervision at this level

have to be selective. I make this point. which I think may
sound disconcerting, not in any way to minimize the responsibility of the Bureau to keep the Department informed
to minimize the Department's duty to find out.

nor

Rather

I want to be realistic about a learning and organization
problem which requires realism if it is to be understood
and perfected.
With respect to possible legislation, the Department

has in preparation various drafts of Possible bills which may
be of assistance in the area of what is now warrantless
electronic

surveillan~e.

Although cbtaining a judicial warrant

does not automatically.eradicate the possibility of abuse.
it is perceived to be an important safeguard of individual
privacy interests, and we are exploring, as we said we would
do, various Possibilities and alternatives.

- 10 Finally, a committee within the Department of Justice
chaired by Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel, and composed of representatives of my
office, the "Criminal and Civil Rights Divisions, the Office of
Policy and Planning, and the FBI

-~

has been working for eight

months reviewing FBI procedures in many areas and drafting guidelines to govern those procedures in the future.

The Committee has

produced draft guidelines covering White House inquiries,
congressional and judicial staff appointment investigations,
unsolicited mail, and domestic

se~urity

investigations.

It is

currently at work on guidelines covering counterespionage investigations and will later consider the use of informants, the employee"
loyalty program, organized crime intelligence investigations,
criminal investigations, and other aspects of FBI practice.
The Committee's work has been

extensiv~

and time-consuming.

It

has involved not only questions of proper safeguards but also of
efficiency in the proper functioning of the Bureau.

It has

been an effort to translate into words the complicated and
important mechani·sms·for controlling the FBI.

I hope the

Committee's efforts at articulation will be of use to this Committee and others as it considers drafting legislation.
You have received copies of the latest drafts of the
guidelines that have been substantially completed .by the Committee.
These guidelines do not yet represent Deparbffient policy.

There

is disagr~ement within the Department on some aspects of these
guidelines.

I have disagreed with the Committee recommendations

423
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from time to time, and the FBI has raised substantial questions
about other recommendations--particularly with respect to the
treatment of unsolicited mail.

Some of the proposals in the

guidelines could be promulgated as departmental regulations.
Congress may feel some ought to be enacted into statutory law.
Other provisions would require implementation by executive order.
I would be glad to discuss these draft guidelines with
you in detail in response to your questions, but a brief discussion
of the

guidelin~on

domestic security may be useful at the outset.

The guidelines begin by attempting to impose some order
and definiteness to the domestic security field.

To begin

with, these guidelines do not deal with FBI efforts to counteract the work of foreign intelligence services operating within
the United States.

Standards for determining when there is

foreign involvement sufficient to place a subject in the category
of foreign counterintelligence investigation are now being debated
within the guidelines committee.

The domestic security guidelines

also are not meant to cover security or background investigations
of federal appointees or investigations of ordinary crimes.

Under

the draft guidelines~ domestic security investigations are only
to be authorized when there is a likelihood that the activities
of individuals or groups involve or will involve the use of force
or violence in violation of federal law.

Domestic security inves-

tigations are to be limited to activities of individuals or groups
intended to accomplish one of five purposes:

overthrowing the

government of the United States or of a State; interfering with
the activities within the United States of foreign governments

- 12'r their representatives; influencing government policies by interering by force or violence with government functions or interstate
ommerce; depriving individuals of their civil rip,hts; and creating
omestic violence or rioting when such violence or rioting would
ecessitate as a countermeasure the use of Federal armed forces.
ere is also a provision for limited investigation when there is a
lear and immediate threat of domestic violence which is likely to
esult in a request by a state for Federal armed assistance.
Currently there is no procedure requiring the review outside the

.

domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI,
the FBI has a long-standing policy of reporting its investifindings to the Criminal Division.

Under the draft guidelines

ere would be a comprehensive program of reporting to the Attorney
neral or his designee of all preliminary and full domestic intelgence investigations.

The Attorney General would be required under

e draft guidelines to put-a stop to any full investigation whose
did not meet an established standard.

The standard

there must he specific and articulable facts giving reason
individual or group under invesation is -engaged in the activities I have just listed.
Another feature of the draft guidelines is to place
upon the use of any technique by the FBI which
• beyond the gathering of information.
given the use of some such techniques.

COINTELPRO was the
As I have said

some of the activities in COINTELPRO were outrageous
}he others were foolish.

,

Nonetheless, there may be circum-

425
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stances
arily

invo~ving

an immediate risk to human life or to extraordin-

important government functions that could only be

countered by some sort of preventive action.

The guidelines

require that any such preventive action proposal be submitted
to the Attorney General.

He could authorize the preventive

action only when there is probable cause to believe that the
violence is imminent and when such measures are necessary to
minimize the danger to life or property.

The preventive action

would in all cases have to be nonviolent.

The Attorney General

would be

r~ed

to report to Congress periodically and no less

often than once a year on the use of preventive action by the
FBI.
I make no claim that during this rather
interesting and--I must trust--promising period
achieved all that might have been possible.
work has been disappointingly slow.

diffic~.lt

but

we have

In many ways the

But I do think we have

made advances in nurturing and helping to improve a structure
-which will be supportive of the best efforts of the men and
women in the Department of Justice and in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

No procedures are fail-safe against abuse.

The 6est protection remains the quality and professionalism of
the membersof the Bureau and of the Department.

